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EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES
OF LAW AND CITIES
Leonard A. Zax*
When modem-day presidential candidates press their case to the
American people in a national election, they are likely to spend most of
their time and energy appealing to suburban voters. Both the substance
of their speeches and the location of their campaign stops will reflect the
fact that America has become in many ways a nation of suburbs rather
than cities.
No observer of the American scene has been more perceptive, and
presciently apprehensive, about the implications of this movement of
people and jobs to the suburbs than Charles M. Haar, the Harvard Law
School professor and author of an important new book entitled Suburbs
Under Siege.' Citing the demographic trends of recent decades, he
writes that America has become the "first and premier suburban
nation."2
For Professor Haar, the most striking and disturbing aspect of
suburban growth has been its exclusivity. Poor and minority families
* Copyright 1996. All rights reserved. Leonard A. Zax is a partner in the law firm
of Latham & Watkins in Washington. He earned a Bachelor of Arts from the University
of Chicago (1971) and a Master in City Planning and Juris Doctor from Harvard
University (1975).
1. CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS
JUDGES (1996).
2. Id. at 4.
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remain locked in central cities, frequently excluded by suburban zoning
laws that deny them the housing opportunities that have been an integral
part of the American dream for half a century.3
In the Nation's most suburbanized state, New Jersey, the problem
took on such serious proportions that the state's highest court issued a
series of landmark judicial decisions. These cases, known as the Mount
Laurel cases after their namesake suburb, the Township of Mount Laurel,
are the subject of Professor Haar's latest book.
Professor Haar tells the story of pathbreaking litigation spanning
over a decade in which the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down
suburban zoning ordinances that severely restricted lower-income housing
development. In its 1975 Mount Laurel I decision,4 the court required
suburban zoning ordinances to permit the development of housing for a
fair share of the region's lower-income housing needs. In the 1983
Mount Laurel 11 decision,5 the court went dramatically further and
imposed on many suburbs the affirmative obligation to use subsidies and
innovative zoning techniques to provide for the construction of lower-
income housing.
The importance of these cases, and Professor Haar's book, extends
far beyond New Jersey. The New York Times reported the Mount Laurel
11 decision on its front page.6 Other national and specialized trade press
publications7 analyzed these decisions which, for the planning law
community, became the spotlight of professional conferences for years.
Several other state courts have held that municipalities have an obligation
to consider regional housing needs in their zoning ordinances.8 Other
state and federal policymakers are wrestling with ways to reduce
3. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
(1994); WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDER CLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
4. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mount Laurel 1).
5. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel 11).
6. Joseph F. Sullivan, Jersey Ruling Aids Housing for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
1983, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Leonard A. Zax & Jerold S. Kayden, A Landmark in Land Use, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 14, 1983, at 11.
8. See 3 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND USE
PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER §§ 66.40-.43 (1985).
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regulatory and discriminatory impediments to affordable housing
developments.9
Adding a human dimension that so rarely flows from appellate
opinions, Professor Haar tells the story of Ethel Lawrence and her
family, the original plaintiffs in the Mount Laurel litigation. 0 Ethel
Lawrence, born and raised in Mount Laurel, where her family had lived
for seven generations, resided in the largely rural area of the township
that was home to much of the township's African-American population.
She helped found a neighborhood action committee that planned to build
about a hundred units of lower-income housing-a development at
variance with Mount Laurel's minimum-acre zoning ordinance. After the
township refused to amend the zoning ordinance, a group of ministers
referred the committee to organizations willing to press the case,
including the Southern Burlington and Camden chapters of the NAACP.
Ethel Lawrence, together with her daughter, Thomasine, who had moved
in with her after living in a converted chicken coop in Mount Laurel,
was instrumental in bringing a class-action lawsuit against the town.
Ethel Lawrence never dreamed, she reported later, how extensive the
lawsuit would be, how much was involved, and how society would react.
After the widely publicized Mount Laurel I decision, the Township
responded by rezoning three widely scattered plots, constituting less than
one-quarter of one percent of its land, to allow for the construction of
lower-income housing units. In the eight year period between the two
Mount Laurel cases, however, not a single unit of lower-income housing
was ever built. The new housing that did appear was located in the large
subdivisions of upper- and middle-income houses.
The New Jersey Supreme Court announced that it would once more
hear the Mount Laurel case, and Professor Haar describes the mysterious
actions surrounding this pronouncement. After the court took the newer
case, it did nothing for two years. Then, in May 1980, the court issued
an extraordinary request, sending out a series of twenty-four written
interrogatories resembling, as Professor Haar suggests, "the questions a
law school professor might include on an examination in a land-use
course," asking that the lawyers focus on answering them in their oral
9. See, e.g., Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing,
"NOT IN My BACKYARD": REMOvING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HousING (1991).
10. HAAR, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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arguments." For example, one question said: "Discuss the function of
expert planners in exclusionary zoning cases."' 2
The oral arguments lasted an unprecedented three days in October
of 1980. The interested parties and the public awaited the judicial
response for years and, once again, nothing happened. Finally, in
January of 1983, Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz delivered the courts'
unanimous opinion. 3
The judges were clearly angered by the fact that Mount Laurel I did
not result in any lower-income housing development. The Chief Justice
complained:
Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the
ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determi-
nation to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe
there is widespread noncompliance with the Constitutional mandate
of our original opinion in this case. 4
The court held that municipal land-use regulations failing to provide
for a fair share of the housing needs of lower-income families in the
region constituted an abuse of the police power and violated the state
constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection. 5  In addition, the court took the far-reaching step of
requiring New Jersey municipalities in designated growth areas to use
affirmative measures to make it realistically possible for the construction
of lower-income housing to occur.' 6
The Mount Laurel II court also suggested the use of a "builder's
remedy," in which the plaintiff-developer's project is in effect subject to
approval by the trial court. 7 This suggestion proved to be one of the
most potentially powerful and controversial elements of Mount Laurel 11.
In a footnote, the court noted that the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development's Section 8 subsidies "remain the most
important for aiding new construction."' 8 This statement was optimistic
11. Id. at 36.
12. Id.
13. Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
14. Id. at 410.
15. Id. at 415.
16. Id. at 418-19.
17. Id. at 452.
18. Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 445 n.27.
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at best, as the Reagan Administration and Congress had just agreed to
end the Section 8 programs for new construction and substantial
rehabilitation. The decision to stop new Section 8 funding in the 1980s
made meaningful low-income housing development extremely difficult.
In light of the changes in federal housing programs, the impact of the
Mount Laurel II decision would have been much greater had it come
down almost a decade earlier.
The Mount Laurel II court provided that determination of a
locality's fair share of regional lower-income housing needs would be
made by one of three trial judges selected by the Chief Justice of the
New Jersey Supreme Court.' 9 The court intended the specially desig-
nated judges to provide consistency and predictability of rules and
intended the selected judges to develop special expertise and knowledge
for similar cases. One of the great contributions of Suburbs Under Siege
is that the reader is able to go behind the judicial process and listen in
on Professor Haar's conversations with some of these judges about the
way this extraordinary series of cases would proceed through the state
court system.
As part of the requirement that municipalities take affirmative
measures to produce housing, Mount Laurel II offered detailed proposals
for procedures designed to resolve new cases efficiently. Upon a finding
by the trial court that a municipality failed to meet its Mount Laurel
obligation, the trial court would order the municipality to revise its
ordinance within ninety days.2" To assist in this effort, the opinion
suggested the trial court appoint a special master to work with all parties
to the litigation and with the court itself in devising appropriate land-use
regulations.2 The New Jersey Supreme Court set the stage for special
masters performing vital roles beyond traditional fact finding:
He or she is an expert, a negotiator, a mediator, and a catalyst-a
person who will help the municipality select from the innumerable
combinations of actions that could satisfy the constitutional
obligation, the one that gives appropriate weight to the many
conflicting interests involved, the one that satisfies not only the
Constitution but, to some extent, the parties as well.22
19. Id. at 438-39.
20. Id. at 458.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 454.
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
146 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:141
The extraordinary role of the special master was one of keen interest
to Professor Haar, who talked with a number of the special masters
whose photographs grace the book's pages much like those of the judges
do. Indeed, the parties viewed the special masters as an arm of the court,
and generally treated them with appropriate respect. Professor Haar
quotes one city planner recalling with pleasant surprise the first time he
acted as a special master. "'To my astonishment,"' he reminisced, "all
the lawyers and officials stood up and most politely waited for me to
begin."'
Professor Haar's book examines such controversial issues as
reconciling the need for communication between the special master and
the judge, and Mount Laurel Is mandate denying ex parte communi-
cations between masters and judges.24 Professor Haar quotes one trial
judge as saying, "that the court could have no contact with the master
without involving the parties was absolutely impossible and absurd, and
frequently when talking about the potential for settlement and bringing
the parties together I had to be able to go to the master and in fact did,
as I've told the chief justice."25
Professor Haar served as special master to the Superior Court in the
Boston Harbor Clean-up Litigation for a three-year period, during which
he had the opportunity to put many of his ideas into practice and learn
first-hand both the limits and great potential of special masters.
Professor Haar describes the group of special masters who operated
"in rotation under the orchestration of the Mount Laurel judges. ,26 He
likens the Mount Laurel bar and group of experts familiar with the issues
to the New York bankruptcy field which "collapses into a small circle of
specialist insiders familiar with each other's capabilities, individuals
working as much for the respect in future recommendations of their peers
as for the temporary client."27 In this way, the Mount Laurel arena has
the unifying presence of the same judges, special masters, law firms, and
21planning experts.
23. HAAR, supra note 1, at 75.
24. Mount Laurel 11, 456 A.2d at 455 n.40 ("Given the sensitive nature of the function,
the master should not communicate privately with the court.").
25. HAAR, supra note 1, at 84.





Professor Haar recognizes the importance of judges expressing their
opinions in a manner calculated to educate and persuade. He asks, "who
but a dedicated devotee could digest a 250-page opinion in this era of the
10-second soundbite?" He sees the need to condense the court's
thesis into a cogent, dramatic argument calling for "a Gettysburg Address
of sorts, a powerful statement sustained by the noble American rallying
cry of fairness and equality in the exercise of governmental powers."3
That is, in essence, what the United States Supreme Court did in Brown
v. Board of Education.3 Similarly, when Thomas Jefferson wrote "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, . . ." he had more of a rhetorical
flourish than a lengthy analysis arguing why the propositions were true.
At the same time, the New Jersey Supreme Court had dropped a
political bombshell on the Garden State and it was only a matter of time
before the legislature responded. The argument against judicial activism
has always been that the legislature is more suited to the weighing of
complex and intersecting societal interests and striking the appropriate
political balance. The judiciary has frequently entered the arena when
the legislature has defaulted; however, in the case of exclusionary zoning
in New Jersey, the ultimate result of Mount Laurel II was to force other
more traditional elements of lawmaking to act. Professor Haar quotes
one Passaic County mayor as succinctly summing up his feelings toward
the seven unanimous justices of Mount Laurel II. "They're nuts!"32
Thus, in the chapter entitled, "The Legislature Strikes Back ... .,"
Professor Haar analyzes how the New Jersey legislature responded. The
pivotal statute was the 1985 Fair Housing Act (FHA)3 4 which the
legislature enacted in order to narrow the reach of the judges. Professor
Haar describes a legislature determined not just to supplant the courts as
program administrators, but to alter, in significant respects, the nature of
the regional fair share housing obligations that could be imposed on
communities as a result of Mount Laurel I. The FHA directed that the
preferred means of addressing fair share controversies thereafter would
be through an administrative agency, the Council On Affordable Housing
29. Id. at 47.
30. HAAR, supra note I, at 47.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. HAAR, supra note 1, at 172.
33. Id. at 89.
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to 52:27D-329 (West 1985).
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(COAH), composed of nine members selected by the governor, subject
to confirmation by the state senate. The New Jersey Supreme Court
sustained the Fair Housing Act in 1986 in a case that Professor Haar
refers to as Mount Laurel 111.35
Continuing his concern for both the law on the books and the law
in action, Professor Haar analyzes the FHA in action. He focuses on the
compliance mechanism, known as the Regional Contribution Agreement
(RCA), under which a locality, by entering into a contractual agreement,
can transfer up to half its Mount Laurel obligations to another locality
within its region. The only condition is that COAH must approve the
RCA before it can go into effect, and such approval must be contingent
on a finding that the agreement establishes a realistic opportunity for
low-income housing with access to employment and that it "is consistent
with sound, comprehensive regional planning.
36
In the end, Professor Haar points to tangible consequences that bear
out the impact of the Mount Laurel decisions. He points to the 15,400
affordable housing units in the New Jersey suburbs that had no prospect
of being built without the Mount Laurel decisions.37 He also notes
zoning revisions that allow for the construction or rehabilitation of some
54,000 additional lower-income housing units in the suburbs, with some
seventy-five percent formulated under the aegis of the courts and the
balance under COAH's jurisdiction.38
Professor Haar believes that the RCA "ended up as the jewel in the
crown of the legislative counterreformation. '39 He notes that, in a key
divergence between legislative and judicial aspirations for Mount Laurel
reform, the RCA shifted the rationale of the Mount Laurel doctrine away
from the broad goal of ending spatial segregation in the region toward
a rationale of simply providing low-income housing, even in the cities.
Professor Haar also observes how Mount Laurel found its "key in
the builder's remedy, which harnessed the personal profit seeking and
affirmative commitment of the private market to meet the affordable
housing target.'"0 He notes that the timing of the up and down cycles
35. Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
36. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-312(a) (West 1985).
37. HAAR, supra note 1, at 131.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 114.
40. Id. at 146.
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of New Jersey's housing boom did not coincide with the high point of
the remedy and so he concludes that, "[t]he wisdom of co-opting private
actions to fuel remedies must wait for the next swing of the business
pendulum to be tested fully."'
The legacy of Mount Laurel that Professor Haar sees is strong,
serious, and continuing. He understands judges as social innovators, the
courts as instruments of social change, and the judicial process as one
that is capable of producing results.
With the publication of Suburbs Under Siege, Professor Haar once
again mounts a singular horse. Where many law scholars and observers
counsel judicial restraint, Professor Haar reminds us of the importance
of the judiciary in acting on matters of large public moment such as the
efforts by suburban communities to exclude the poor. He also emerges
from this volume as overly modest. Where others might have proceeded
to highlight their own personal role in the saga, Professor Haar notes his
personal contribution only in a single, discreetly-placed footnote.
In fact, Professor Haar played a very important role in the develop-
ment of this caselaw in New Jersey, going back to a 1953 Harvard Law
Review article42 he wrote as a young assistant professor. In that article,
Haar criticized the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to uphold
excessive minimum floor space requirements imposed by a growing New
Jersey suburb, Paterson. In that case,43 the New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded: "[S]o long as the zoning ordinance was reasonably designed,
by whatever means, to further the advancement of a community as a
social, economic and political unit, it is in the general welfare and
therefore a proper exercise of the zoning power."
This Assistant Professor of Law rejected the court's reasoning:
"The New Jersey Supreme Court substituted shibboleths for reasoning,
and used liberal shibboleths to attain an illiberal result-a decision which
can only still further distort the problems arising from the complex
relationship of city and country." '45 Three decades before Mount Laurel
II, Haar recognized the "need for some type of regional or metropolitan
41. Id.
42. Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1051 (1953).
43. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 89 A.2d 693 (NJ. 1952).
44. Id. at 697.
45. Haar, supra note 42, at 1063.
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planning in order that courts may have a standard against which to
measure legislative determinations.'" 6
Professor Haar held true to the cause, and three decades later the
New Jersey Supreme Court came to see the light. This wonderfully
written book tells the story of how the court eventually reached his
conclusion, bringing to fruition Professor Haar's quest to expand the
boundaries of law and cities.
46. Id. The first decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding the validity
of comprehensive zoning, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926),
contained suggestive dicta on the issue of regionalism:
But the Village, though physically a suburb of Cleveland, is politically a separate
municipality, with powers of its own and authority to govern itself as it sees fit....
It is not meant by this, however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the general
public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.
Euclid, 272 U.S. at 389-90. Professor Michael Allan Wolf has written of the centrality of
the Euclid decision in land use planning law and this quotation is just one of many that
proves his point. See Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v.
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